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The inability to collect taxes 2 , which commonly form the financial basis for all other state functions (e.g. internal and external security, public welfare), is one of the most fundamental deficits in this respect (van de Walle 2001b: 182-183; Bräutigam 2002: 14; Olowu 2003: 105) . An IMF study (1997: 6-7) found that in some African countries more than 60% of the tax potential remains untapped. As a consequence, hardly any of the African states is financially self-sufficient. The continent today is the most donor-dependent region in the world (World Bank Africa Database 2005) . The perspective of neopatrimonialism implies that this cannot only be attributed to Africa's low socio-economic status, but also to political interference with the process of collecting state revenues. It is this premise this article will test in respect to Zambia, a country whose political practice -similar to other African states -is assumed to be characterised by neopatrimonialism. 3 Since colonial times, Zambia's state finances have been based on the extraction of copper.
The sharp decline of world market prices for the mineral resource in the mid-1970s caused a severe revenue and economic crisis. In 2000 real GDP per capita had declined to only about 55% of its 1975 level (World Bank 2003: 112) . Up to the 2005 Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) debt relief, Zambia had been one of the most-heavily indebted countries in sub-Saharan Africa (IMF 2005a) . Despite the need for new sources of state income, the singleparty government of President Kaunda refrained from strengthening domestic tax collection.
Only after the reintroduction of the multi-party system in 1991 and the electoral success of the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD), the new government radically strengthened domestic revenue generation. Yet, the indicators show that Zambia's political elite has resorted to neopatrimonial practices largely unabatedly. The country therefore constitutes a particular interesting case study for analysing neopatrimonialism and its effects on the collection of state revenue.
Empirically, over 75 qualitative interviews conducted in Zambia allow for 'process tracing'
and provide most of this study's empirical value added. Six respondent groups from inside as well as outside the tax administration were interviewed. 4 The respondents were tax officers from a) the management and from b) middle/low hierarchy levels, business persons, civil society representatives, politicians and political decision makers, social scientists and employees from international organisations. In addition, primary sources such as the tax administration's annual reports and the budget speeches were systematically analysed. 2 In this article, the terms 'taxes' or 'revenue' encompass income taxes, value-added taxes and customs duties. 3 Posner and Simon (2002: 331) portray Zambia as a 'modal case' in the African context. 4 Field work was conducted from 4 March to 27 May 2004. Research permission granted by the Zambia Revenue Authority is greatly acknowledged. The article starts by conceptualising the main facets of neopatrimonialism. It then sets out to operationalise and analyse neopatrimonialism in Zambia with the indicators introduced. In the third step the article assesses the effects of neopatrimonialism on the collection of revenue. The main finding is that the relationship between neopatrimonialism and central tax collection is highly context-specific and dependent upon the specific interaction with other variables. As will be outlined in the conclusion, there is need to also take into account these intervening variables, in this case particularly donor influence, in order to apply neopatrimonialism for analysing political practice in the African state.
Conceptualising Neopatrimonialism
Neopatrimonialism is a 'universal concept' which its proponents perceive to have particular value for explaining Africa's state weaknesses, democratic deficiencies and economic crisis. Bratton and van de Walle (1997: 277) for instance maintain that 'the distinctive institutional hallmark of African regimes is neopatrimonialism'. The basic proposition of the heuristic concept is that informal, particularistic politics of the rulers pervade formal state institutions. The separation between the public and the private realm, which stands at the basis of the 'modern' conception of the state, is abrogated. 5 Principally, the term neopatrimonialism denotes the simultaneous operation of the two Weberian ideal types of patrimonial and rational-legal domination (Clapham 1985: 48; Bratton/van de Walle 1997: 62) . Patrimonialism connotes that a patron in a certain social and political order bestows gifts from own resources on followers in order to secure their loyalty and support (Weber 1980 (Weber [1922 . Clients, in turn, obtain material benefits and protection. In a neopatrimonial system, patrons typically are office-holders in state institutions who misuse public funds or office in order to stay in power. Social practice as a result is fundamentally different compared to the impersonal formal rules which are supposed to guide official action (Erdmann/Engel 2006: 18; Alence 2004: 165) .
Taking the case of tax collection, it can be hypothesised that neopatrimonialism leads to political interference 6 with the tax administration and in turn reduces state revenue. Donors as well as scientists regard these organisations as focal points of interference from the political sphere (World Bank 2002: 111; Gill 2003: 1; Rose-Ackerman 2004: 28) . Two prime ways of undue influence from the political sphere are possible: First, the placement of unqualified top-, middle-and low-level tax officers, which fill patronage positions. Second, For an extensive discussion of the neopatrimonialism concept see Erdmann/Engel (2006) . 6 This article understands every policy or political action which violates the rational-legal logic of the tax administration and the administrative chain of command as 'interference'. 8 von Soest: How Does Neopatrimonialism Affect the African State? nial interference with the tax administration's day-to-day business in order to prevent audits at businesses that enjoy political protection, to inhibit controls at border posts and to harass opponents of the neopatrimonial 'big man'. Both strategies serve the political interest of securing authority and the private interest of reducing tax payments. They keep the tax administration weak and in turn significantly reduce the room for self-sufficiently financing the African state.
Reading the vast array of literature on neopatrimonialism in sub-Saharan Africa, it is striking that widely accepted indicators for this political practice are inexistent and that systematic analyses of its effects on public policy are rare (one exception is Kjaer 2004) . The key methodological aim of this article therefore is to contribute to the systematic operationalisation of the concept. In accordance to Bratton and van de Walle (1997: 63-68) , it applies the three features 'systematic concentration of political power', 'award of personal favours' and 'use of state resources for political legitimation' for assessing the neopatrimonial profile of Zambia. Such analysis provides strong indications about the character of the Zambian state and will reveal the strong continuity of neopatrimonial practices in the country.
Neopatrimonialism in Zambia
Since independence, Zambia's rulers have consistently applied all three features of neopatrimonial politics.
Concentration of Political Power
The first facet, the systematic concentration of political power, implies the dominance of one individual, 'who resists delegating all but the most trivial decision-making tasks' (Bratton/ van de Walle 1997: 63) . 7 As a defining feature of this 'big man politics', the president or, in other words, the patron, stays in power for a long time, sometimes until the end of his life.
Indeed, presidents in sub-Saharan Africa on average officiate significantly longer than their counterparts in Asia and Latin America (Bienen/van de Walle 1992: 693). Young speaks of '"life president" power management' (1994: preface on x). On the other hand, neopatrimonial rulers frequently rotate the political elite in order to prevent any potential opponent from developing his or her own power base and also in order to extend the clientelist net-7 Bratton and van de Walle term this feature 'presidentialism'. However, this is misleading as the traditional political science definition of presidentialism refers to political systems in which the president is directly elected by the electorate, exerts the executive power and cannot be deselected by parliament (in contrast to parliamentary systems). This article therefore refers to the phenomenon in question as 'concentration of political power'. (Snyder/Mahoney 1999: 108-109; Snyder 1992: 392) . The simultaneous fulfilment of both requirements, a long tenure of presidents and a short tenure of key government members, therefore suggests a neopatrimonial power concentration.
This has exactly been the case in Zambia. With Kenneth Kaunda, Frederick Chiluba and Levy Mwanawasa, the country has only seen three Presidents since independence in 1964.
Their average length of tenure amounts to 14 years 8 , which stands above the 11.6 years African state leaders have on average managed to stay in power from 1980 to 2005 (van de Walle 2005: 74).
The first President Kaunda served for 27 years in office and entrenched his power with a corps of personal advisors which in turn reduced the influence of the cabinet and other units of the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP). He not only gained from particular legitimacy as Zambia's founding President who had led the struggle for independence but also augmented his control of the political process by promulgating the one-party state in December 1972 (Tordoff/Molteno 1974: 252; Scott 1980: 152) .
The neopatrimonial centralisation of power in Zambia also finds expression in the frequent change of ministers. The average tenure of key ministers from independence until today stands at only 2.4 years. 9 Consequently, the most important cabinet members have exercised their functions for only half of a legislative period on average. This pattern of 'elite circulation' (Burnell 2001b: 241) has shown a high degree of consistency and has endured during Zambia's one-party Second Republic (from end of 1972 to 1991) and during the multi-party Third Republic (since November 1991).
In a major cabinet reshuffle in April 1993 for instance, President Chiluba removed those reform-minded ministers he perceived to be a threat to his rule from office. Others were frustrated to the extent that they resigned from government (Erdmann/Simutanyi 2003: 14) .
With an average tenure of less than two years, the 'ministerial game of musical chairs' 8 Article 35 (2) of the 1991/1996 Constitution (Republic of Zambia 2004) restricts the tenure of office of the President to the maximum of two five-year terms. Hence, in Zambia's multi-party 'Third Republic' the President is eligible to one re-election only. This term limit became contested in 2000 when some quarters in the ruling party MMD -apparently backed by the President -tried to amend the constitution in order to allow for a third term of President Chiluba. Only after massive public protests was this exercise stopped (Rakner/Svåsand 2005: 97; Rakner 2003: 114) . These manoeuvres strengthen the case being made in this article of a neopatrimonial power concentration in Zambia. (Tordoff/Molteno 1974: 254) in the key departments has not slowed down under the current President Mwanawasa who was re-elected on 28 September 2006 (Electoral Commission of Zambia 2006 . In sum, the neopatrimonial concentration of political power has been a feature consistently applied in Zambian politics.
Award of Personal Favours
Not only do Zambia's Presidents frequently rotate ministers, they also award personal favours to other elite members in order to secure their rule. A prime means has been the expansion of the ministerial cabinet, which features prominently for awarding personal favours in Africa (van de Walle 2001a: 32-33). The Zambian cabinet has grown significantly over the years; from 14 ministers in 1964 to currently 23 members. 10 This is congruent with the trend in many African countries. Van de Walle shows that the average number of cabinet ministers in the region rose from 20.1 members in 1979 to 24.6 in 2000 (2005: 80) . 11 As in Zambia, these cabinet sizes cannot be substantiated with functional necessities. Most developed countries, having much larger populations and economies, are governed by cabinets of only 15 to 20 ministers (OECD 2004: 2).
The number of core cabinet ministers only moderately reflects the real enlargement of patronage posts in the Zambian government. In 1968, President Kaunda appointed ministers for each of Zambia's nine provinces. After the introduction of the one-party state, the UNIP Central Committee became a parallel structure to the ministerial cabinet (van Donge 1995: 196) . The President also created additional posts in order to pursue his policy of 'tribal balancing' in Zambia's multi-ethnic society (Carey 2002: 60) . Despite Zambia's severe and enduring economic crisis, originally caused by the sharply decreasing world-market prices of copper in the mid-1970s, the ministerial cabinet went up to a peak of 27 ministers (1986 to 1988) during the Second Republic. Furthermore, the 'UNIP patronage machine' (Bratton 1994 : 104) massively expanded public sector employment. Following Bates and Collier (1993: 391) , in 1985, the party filled over 40,000 public offices in Zambia's capital Lusaka alone.
After the transition from the one-party state to multi-party rule and the formation of his 
Misuse of State Resources
The misuse of state resources 12 , the third feature of neopatrimonialism, has also character- During the Second Republic, a Leadership Code obliged all cabinet and Central Committee members to separate public office and private interests (Kaunda 1972, par. 4 ). Yet, the text of the code was not put into practice. A general pattern emerged of misusing public functions and resources. 13 It became apparent that 'bribes and favours offered a host of rewards for "gatekeeping' services"' (Szeftel 2000: 210) . Monitoring institutions such as the Anti-Corruption Commission remained toothless and the infrequent exposure of government malpractices did not counter the systematic misappropriation of public resources (Afronet 2002: 89; van Donge 1995: 198; Tordoff/Molteno 1974: 287) .
President Chiluba's government also misused state resources, often to the advantage of the ruling party MMD (Erdmann/Simutanyi 2003: 72; Szeftel 2000: 217) . 14 According to Trans-12 (Burnell 2001b: 251; Simon 2005: 209) . 15 In the face of these developments, President Mwanawasa began his tenure on 2 January 2002 by declaring his administration to be 'a government of laws not of men'. One of the centrepieces of his 'new deal' government was the proclaimed fight against corruption (Erdmann/ Simutanyi 2003: 78; Simon 2005: 212) . He lifted the immunity of former President Chiluba and charged him and some of his allies with abuse of office. However, there are strong indications that President Mwanawasa's campaign has remained inconsequential and is primarily used as a way of silencing his opponents (TIZ 2002: 30; EIU 2005: 16) . The misuse of state resources has remained a recurrent feature of Zambian politics.
On balance, political practice in Zambia since independence in 1964 has been characterised by neopatrimonialism. Due to its inherent lack of accountability, the single-party state in the Second Republic seems to have reinforced the neopatrimonial impulse (Bratton 1994: 125) .
Yet, it is striking to see the neopatrimonial continuity throughout the Third Republic after the abolition of single-party rule. This deeply ingrained system of neopatrimonialism has created a hostile environment for a rational-legal tax administration and the collection of stronger civil society, media and donor oversight than the Second Republic. The common perception that misuse of state resources was more rampant under President Chiluba's rule might therefore been an artefact caused by the different quality of sources. 15 See also Burnell's (2001a) However, available evidence paints the picture of an increasingly ailing administration.
With the introduction of the one-party state in December 1972, Zambia's administrative structure lost most of its operational autonomy and had to predominately follow a political logic. Goldsmith (1999: 544) Working for the tax administration was very unattractive as the salary levels were low and the employment conditions poor. By 1991, the real remuneration for most public sector groups had declined to only 11-22% of its 1975 value (World Bank 2003: 114) . The fundamental reason could be found in Zambia's severe economic and fiscal crisis, which restricted the state's ability to remunerate its numerous civil servants properly. A second reason was that, as in many African countries, high inflation rates eroded more than 80% of the purchasing power of civil servants (van de Walle 2005: 78). According to an annual report from the Department of Taxes, trained tax officers 'tend to leave for greener pastures largely because they can be much better remunerated elsewhere or they stand better chances of promotion in other Government organs and hence get higher pay' (DTZ 1987: 9).
The recruitment, promotion and remuneration policies of Zambia's tax administration deviated considerably from the Weberian concept of public administration. This deficient merit orientation of tax administration managers and tax officers shows that Zambia's pressing need for new sources of revenue did not translate into the government strengthening the tax administration and increasingly collecting taxes from citizens and companies.
The logic of neopatrimonialism was also felt in the day-to-day business of doing tax assessments and evaluating customs duties. According to a former tax officer, 'some people had better treatment, the big shots. It depended on who you are ' (14.4.2004, int. 
Reform amidst Zambia's Neopatrimonial Environment
The effect of neopatrimonialism on the tax collection completely changed after the regime transition in late 1991. The newly-elected MMD government not only swiftly liberalised Zambia's fiscal and economic policy (e.g. Craig 2001) but also negotiated new loan agreements with the donor community. In the face of the experiences in the 1980s, the IMF on its part added the strengthening of internal revenue collection to its conditionalities for the provision of new loans (Hill 2004: 141; Gloppen/Rakner 2002: 32) . This proved to be of crucial importance, as the route of de facto unconditionally financing the state through external funds was now closed. Reform of the tax collection was inevitable for the strengthening of both internal and external state revenues.
In 1992, the British government funded initial studies, which recommended the establishment of a semi-autonomous revenue authority (Coopers & Lybrand 1992; Gray et al. 2001). 17 The arguments for taking the revenue generation out of Zambia's core state structure were two-fold. The first was to increase revenue performance through the business-like collection of taxes (see in general Devas et al. 2001 ). The second reason was to insulate the tax administration from Zambia's neopatrimonial environment, i.e. from political interference (Tax Policy Task Force 1992: 4).
The Zambia Revenue Authority (ZRA), replacing the ministerial Departments of Taxes and Customs and Excise started to operate on 1 April 1994. Its executive Commissioner General is appointed by the Zambian President and alone is responsible for the collection of revenue.
He or she reports to a nine-member Governing Board and not to the Ministry of Finance and National Planning (Republic of Zambia 1996: sec. 10 (1), (3)).
The creation of the ZRA not only was a precondition for further donor support but was also in the interest of the new Zambian government. The revenue authority, as other institutional innovations created in the 'honeymoon period' of the Chiluba government, acted as a forceful symbol of its commitment to turn Zambia's public administration around. The addressees of this visible 'reform barometer' were both the Zambian population and the donor community. 18 As will be shown, this institutional restructuring has reduced the effect of neopatrimonialism on the collection of revenue in Zambia but at the same time has been consistent with a neopatrimonial rationale.
Strong Expatriate Management and Merit Orientation of Staff
The ZRA has been a reform project closely monitored by donors. Until 2004, the British Department for International Development (DFID) provided technical assistance worth £15.8 million to the project. 19 The most prominent aspect was the provision of an expatriate management team for the ZRA. In the beginning, none of the authority's four most senior managers was Zambian. Three Commissioners, including the Commissioner General, were from the United Kingdom and one from Tanzania.
Foreign personnel was thought to be less integrated into local social networks and less responsive to Zambia's neopatrimonial environment (Kasanga 1996: 21; Delay et al. 1999: 23; Gray/Chapman 2001: 40) . According to the long-serving Economic Advisor to President Chiluba, 'it was a deliberate policy to have top managers paid by DFID. It was a very important influence to de-link Commissioners from local politics ' (22.4.2004, int.) . Their task was to instil a new sense of professionalism in Zambia's tax administration. Only in February 2002, almost nine years after the creation of the tax agency, the expatriate Commissioner General as the last manager from abroad left and was followed by a Zambian. The donors' strategy therefore was to insulate the revenue authority from its neopatrimonial environment by bringing in foreign managers.
The ZRA's local managers maintain close connections to the political sphere (Gloppen/Rakner 2002: 34) . The intimate exchange became obvious when a dismissed Commissioner of Customs directly appealed to the President and was reinstated following pressure from the Presidency (Times of Zambia 20.5.2004; Times of Zambia 25.5.2004). Although politicians do not openly interfere with the recruitment process as seems to be the case in other countries' revenue authorities (for Uganda see Therkildsen 2004: 73), a high number of ZRA employees feel that politics are involved in the appointment of senior managers. Even one member of the ZRA's Governing Board consented that 'a lot of them have access to politicians' (26.5.2004, int.) . However, the ZRA has brought a significant increase in the qualification of tax administration managers. The neopatrimonial environment today exerts less influence on them than under the old dispensation.
The lack of merit orientation among low level and middle level staff had been one of the main deficits of the former tax administration Departments. In contrast, the ZRA pursues its own recruitment policy for tax officers, thereby circumventing the Public Service Commis-18 von Soest: How Does Neopatrimonialism Affect the African State? sion which is responsible for the rest of Zambia's civil service (see in general Devas et al. 2001: 214) . Before the revenue authority was launched, every civil servant had to reapply in order to be employed by the new institution. The revenue authority only took over the bestqualified officers which had not been involved in corrupt activities.
Later, the management introduced minimum qualifications, meaning that every middlelevel tax officer must hold a diploma or a higher degree from university. This entrance barrier has been of crucial importance for the ZRA's merit orientation: Managers can 'hide behind' 20 it and so resist the recruitment of unqualified staff due to neopatrimonial pressures.
Accordingly, ZRA employees and external respondents overwhelmingly perceived the recruitment process for low and middle level tax officers to be transparent and fair. This general perception was mirrored by respondents from outside Zambia's tax administration.
Furthermore, a high-level remuneration scheme makes employment at the revenue authority very attractive. On its inception, the ZRA paid tax officers on average two-or three-fold the salary they had received in government. A middle ranking officer in 1994 earned Kwacha 49,000 per month and after 1 April 1994, the launch of the ZRA, the same employee was paid K140,000. 21 Additionally, the authority provides substantial allowances and benefits.
Tax officers today belong to the best-paid employees in Zambia and -together with the central bank's staff -form the administrative elite of the country.
It is one of the revenue authority's biggest achievements, that it has largely de-linked the employment of administrative staff from Zambia's neopatrimonial environment. The 75 interviews with respondents from inside and outside the ZRA provide strong indications that the merit orientation of tax officers has improved considerably. This is despite the fact that Zambia's political actors have continuously made use of neopatrimonial practices. The prime actors setting the ZRA's foundations were, however, expatriate and not local managers. In this regard, the revenue authority for a long time was an 'exterritorial' organisation.
Restricted Interference with Day-to-day Business
Despite donor surveillance and general government support, it appears that in various instances taxpayers have received preferential treatment whereas others have been harassed. 22 This indicates some neopatrimonial influence on the ZRA's day-to-day business of assessing tax liabilities.
At least in the beginning, prominent MMD politicians and their businesses were not controlled through tax audits (Kasanga 1996: 23) . A common phrase employees heard from their managers in these cases was 'don't go to this man, this man is difficult'. Respondents mentioned several politician-owned companies which allegedly have never paid tax. Furthermore, the ZRA was apparently told not to control 'special' government members for dutiable goods at border posts.
On the other hand, the Chiluba government used arbitrary tax auditing and fines as a means of pursuing an 'almost irrational behaviour […] towards outspoken NGOs' (Erdmann/ Simutanyi 2003: 42) . For example, in 2003 it set bailiffs on the organisation Afronet for tax evasion. Seven cars and other property were sized (Erdmann/Simutanyi 2003: 57) . One prominent member of the Zambian NGO Forum for Democratic Process (FODEP) reported a similar incident. According to him, the organisation did not have any tax arrears, which makes this measure arbitrary (26.4.2004, int.) . It was only following donor pressure that seized FODEP money was released.
This suggests that taxation in the Third Republic in some cases has been used for harassment of opponents or for the provision of unlawful benefits to government members. Affirmed by a former Commissioner General, he indeed sometimes reported to the British Ambassador or the local IMF Representative in order to protect the interests of the ZRA visà-vis the Zambian government. In general, however, Zambia's government has limited undue influence on the revenue authority's day-to-day business compared to its predecessor institutions. Affirmed by most respondents, even from civil society, instances of positive or negative discrimination have at least in the recent years not been of a systemic nature.
Increased but Stagnating Revenue Performance
The restriction of neopatrimonial interference has resulted in improved revenue performance. The tax-to-GDP ratio went up sharply from 15.3 to 18.7% in the first year of ZRA's operation (World Bank 2003: 15), total revenue collected increased by 61% (Kasanga 1996: 17) . 22 There was no other question on which respondents gave such disparate answers. While the ZRA management claimed that there is no political interference, some employees on the low/middle level as well as NGO representatives strongly maintained that there has been selective application of the tax code in Zambia.
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In the following years, the tax take has largely remained stagnant. This stagnation could be attributed to tax policy changes, tax exemptions and Zambia's unfavourable economic development (Gray et al. 2001: 21-23; Hill 2004: 137) . The major factors depressing the tax-to-GDP ratio therefore lay beyond the revenue authority's influence. Yet since 2000 Zambia's economy has grown by 4.4% on average (IMF 2005b: 55) with no increase in the tax-to-GDP ratio, indicating that the ZRA has not been able to participate in the expanding economy.
This initial upward movement in revenue performance followed by stagnation or even decline has been a characteristic feature of semi-autonomous revenue authorities in Africa (Fjeldstad/Rakner 2003: 17; Gray/Chapman 2001: 26) .
At least in the Zambian case, this can primarily be attributed to the small tax base the ZRA collects from. The authority has largely desisted from the administratively (and politically) demanding task of expanding direct taxation. As affirmed by a DFID-study, the ZRA's impact on direct tax collection has remained 'modest' (Gray et al. 2001: 12) . Income tax collection never amounted to more than eight per cent of GDP -not even in the most recent years with comparatively strong economic growth (IMF 2006: 35) . With formal sector employment accounting for less than 20% of Zambia's economically active population (Central Statistical Office 1999: 40) , the burden of income tax centres on the few individuals working for registered companies and the public service. Despite the remarkable initial improvement of revenue performance, this focus on easily accessible taxpayers inherently restricts the scope for increased revenue collection in Zambia.
Conclusion
The analysis of neopatrimonialism and the collection of revenue in Zambia provides answers to two basic questions: What are neopatrimonialism's consequences for financing the African state? And, secondly, what do this study's results mean for the empirical applicability of the neopatrimonialism concept?
The three features 'concentration of political power', 'award of personal favours' and 'misuse of state resources' reveal a striking continuity of neopatrimonial practice despite Zambia's regime transition in 1991. They confirm that constitutional change affects neopatrimonialism 'very little' (Szeftel 2000: 221) . However, despite this neopatrimonial stability, the semi-autonomous ZRA has brought a significant increase in revenue performance. With around 18% of GDP a larger part of state revenue today comes from domestic sources than under the old administrative structure. This changing performance indicates that there is no linear correlation between neopatrimonialism and the collection of revenue. The basic expec- [28] [29] [30] . This practice creates much leeway for the government to appropriate funds for particularistic use without parliamentary oversight.
The specific effects of Zambia's neopatrimonialism on the collection of domestic state revenue have changed, but neopatrimonialism has not vanished. It could even be possible that the strengthened revenue generation provides additional funds for neopatrimonial practices, i.e. have even increased them on the whole. This reasoning fits well into other literature hypothesising that 'new, relatively powerful Revenue Authorities that aid donors have been helping to establish in Africa have become major conduits for accumulating and channelling unrecorded revenues in wrong hands' (Moore/Rakner 2002: 7) . The reform of the tax administration in Zambia hence appears to be a typical example of the 'partial reform syndrome' (for Africa see van de Walle 2001b: 60-63; for Zambia Rakner 2003: 168) , meaning that political leaders only carry out reforms which do not hurt their vested interests.
Although it is not possible to directly infer revenue performance from the neopatrimonial profile, the three indicators used in this article allow for systematic assessment of the dominating political practice in Zambia and, in turn, the political environment the tax administration has to deal with. For moving analysis forward, the three features 'concentration of political power', 'award of personal favours', and 'misuse of state resources' can form the basis of comparatively assessing neopatrimonial practices in various African states. This would serve to systematically establish differences and commonalities of neopatrimonialism on the continent.
However, despite being an independent variable of crucial importance, the question about the effect of the 'elusive' practice of neopatrimonialism is too general and, in turn, not falsifiable (see Therkildsen for a similar argument, 2005: 48-50). It is determined by the interdependence with other variables, with donor influence being the most important in this case.
The donors' strategy has been to diminish the influence of Zambia's neopatrimonial envi-
